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Abstract 
This study examines the association of unemployment variation with intimate partner violence using 
representative data from thirty one developing countries, through 2005 to 2016. It finds that a 1 
percent increase in the male unemployment rate is associated with an increase in the incidence of 
physical violence against women by 0.50 percentage points, or 2.75 percent. This is consistent with 
financial and psychological stress generated by unemployment. Female unemployment rates have the 
opposite effect, a 1 percent decrease being associated with an increase in the probability of 
victimization of 0.52 percentage points, or 2.87 percent. That an improvement in women’s 
employment opportunities is associated with increased violence is consistent with male backlash. The 
study finds that this pattern of behaviours emerges entirely from countries in which women have more 
limited access to divorce than men. 
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1.  Introduction 
Intimate partner violence (IPV) is pervasive, with about one in three women in richer as well 
as poorer countries reporting abuse over their lifetime (Devries et. al. 2013). It is increasingly being 
recognized as an important part of the development agenda (WHO 2014, Michau et al. 2015, UN 
Women 2015a). While there were no targets for violence against women in the Millennium 
Development Goals, the new Sustainable Development Goals explicitly call for the “elimination of all 
forms of violence against women and girls” (UN, 2015). IPV tends to be higher in low income 
countries, being 65.64% in Central Sub-Saharan Africa and 41.73% in South Asia, compared to 
27.85% and 21.32% in Central Europe and North America, respectively (Devries et. al. 2013). It not 
only harms the physical and mental health of women, it also harms children (Ellsberg et al. 2008, 
Aizer, 2011, Rawlings and Siddique, 2018). In the last decade, many countries have implemented laws 
criminalizing IPV, but the extent to which such laws are upheld varies hugely (OECD Development 
Centre, 2014). 
This paper considers how IPV varies with macroeconomic conditions, in particular, male and 
female unemployment rates, using comparable data for thirty one developing countries. It considers 
male and female unemployment shocks, each conditional upon the other. Since these are correlated 
with one another but may have different impacts on violence, omitting either one will tend to bias the 
coefficient on the other and this study shows that this is the case.6 Of particular interest is how violence 
against individual women is associated with improved aggregate employment prospects for women. 
This is important because many interventions in developing countries, for example, microcredit 
schemes and skills training programmes, are designed to increase women’s employment. The direction 
                                                          
6 Independent variation in male relative to female unemployment rates may arise for instance because recessions 
have larger impacts on sectors of the economy that are more intensive in male-labour (Anderberg et al. 2016) 
or on account of added worker effects that lead to more women seeking work during recessions (Bhalotra and 
Umana-Aponte 2015 and references therein). 
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of any association is unclear unless it is assumed that improved outside options can be leveraged to 
the woman’s advantage. On the one hand, increases in women’s employment opportunities may be 
expected to empower them and thus lower violence and, on the other, this may challenge gender 
norms leading to increased violence.  
This study finds that a 1 percent increase in the male unemployment rate is associated with an 
increase in the incidence of physical violence against women by 0.50 percentage points (or 2.75 
percent) while a one percent increase in female unemployment rates is associated with a reduction in 
the incidence of violence by 0.52 percentage points (or 2.87 percent). The pooled (male plus female) 
unemployment rate has no significant association with IPV7. The results are robust to a number of 
checks, including different measures of business cycle variation, and a leave-one-out analysis. 
Although the study avoids using this as the main specification, if the unemployment rate is replaced 
with the individual (un)employment status of the woman, a similar result is found, namely, that the 
employment of the individual woman is predictive of IPV. The study investigates whether these 
associations vary with whether there are restrictions on women’s access to divorce and find that the 
results emerge entirely from countries in which women face greater legal and social barriers to divorce 
than men.8 In countries where women and men have equal access to divorce, the results are reversed, 
in line with recent results for the UK (Anderberg et al. 2016) and the US (Aizer, 2010). 
A contribution of this study is that it paints a broad brush picture for a large sample of 
developing countries. A further contribution is that it examines how the association of violence with 
male and female unemployment rates varies with the cultural and legal accessibility of divorce for 
women relative to men. The study shows a striking reversal of results by whether or not access is 
equal. However, it is not possible to obtain causal identification of the relationships of interest in this 
                                                          
7 This result is also shown in Anderberg et al (2016). 
8 The authors are grateful to the Editor, Eric Edmonds for making this interesting suggestion. 
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large and diverse sample.9 Earlier studies have tended to focus on the experience of individual 
countries, and often on responses of IPV to an individual woman working,(e.g. Bowlus and Seitz, 2006; 
Chin, 2012; Tertilt and Van den Berg, 2015) and these studies are mostly set in developed countries.10 
In contrast, this study considers macroeconomic shocks in a cross-section of countries over time.11,12  
Closely related to our approach are two recent studies, set in the US and the UK respectively, 
which consider how macroeconomic changes in relative male and female economic opportunities 
influence IPV.13 Using demand driven variation in female relative to male wages at the county level in 
the United States, Aizer (2010) shows that IPV is decreasing in women’s relative wages. Anderberg et 
al. (2016) similarly find that improvements in the relative employment rates of women in the UK are 
associated with lower rates of IPV, and that male unemployment acts to inhibit IPV.14 These findings 
can be rationalized with reference to a household bargaining model in which better labour market 
prospects for women relative to men increase their bargaining power by improving their outside 
options. The higher the threat point of women, the more averse men are to committing violence that 
may enhance the risk of marital dissolution (Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997). This study is able to 
                                                          
9 As discussed below, recent country specific studies instrument unemployment rates with a Bartik-style 
instrument. This is not possible in the sample in this paper since it would be necessary to gather data on 
industrial composition for every country in the sample. On the other hand, by virtue of using data from several 
countries, the results have wider scope. The study is also able to investigate the role of barriers to divorce. 
10 Understanding domestic violence in developing countries is important because rates are higher and women’s 
outside options are more limited, related to their having weaker property rights (Agarwal, 1994; World Bank, 
2012), more limited labour market opportunities, and facing cultural and legal barriers to divorce. 
11 This is useful because the macroeconomic unemployment rate captures changes in all women’s employment 
opportunities, including those who do not work. 
12 Here, the study has summarized research predicting IPV, without attempting a comprehensive survey and 
focusing upon studies that model IPV as a function of individual employment or aggregate unemployment 
rates. There is a wider literature. For instance, Gulesci et al. (forthcoming) find that mothers whose daughters 
were exposed to compulsory schooling increases are 12 percentage points less likely to find domestic violence 
justifiable, and there is not similar spillover associated with increases in their son’s education. Other studies 
have explained familial or regional variation in IPV with reference to cross-sectional differences in childhood 
experiences or the historical shaping of gender norms respectively (Alesina et al. 2016; Tur Prats 2015). 
13 Both of these studies use the Bartik instrument, relying upon variation in local industry shares.  
14 Other studies that highlight the beneficial impacts of women’s own employment and income for IPV include 
Bowlus and Seitz (2006), Tauchen et al. (1991), Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997) and Pronyk et al. (2006). 
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replicate this pattern of results in this sample but only for the small fraction of countries in which 
women and men are similarly placed to access divorce (as is the case in the UK and US). 
The main findings contrast sharply with the results for the UK and the US and can be 
explained by women in many low and middle income countries having weak outside options on 
account of social norms and embedded economic and political disadvantage (Bloch and Rao 2002, 
Anderson and Eswaran, 2009).  For many of the countries in the sample, woman lack equal access to 
divorce relative to men (Table S1.2 in the supplementary online appendix, available with this article at 
The World Bank Economic Review website). This limits the extent to which divorce can act as a margin of 
adjustment and leaves women within marriage in a more vulnerable position even when economic 
opportunities for them improve.  
As a result, improved job opportunities for women may not increase the probability that they 
exit marriage. Instead, outside job opportunities for women may act to threaten gender stereotypes 
and prime male identity, leading to male backlash (Macmillan and Gartner, 1999). Some previous 
studies have documented evidence of backlash whereby men react negatively to higher earnings of 
women or to women performing non-traditional roles (Schuler et al 1996, Luke and Munshi 2011, 
Mani 2011, Gagliarducci and Paserman 2012, Bertrand et al 2015, Gangadharan et al 2016). The 
coefficient on the male unemployment rate flips in developing countries for a similar reason. If divorce 
initiated by the woman is not a real threat, then male unemployment rates will not tame men but, 
instead create psychological and financial stress that can lead to higher IPV (Angelucci 2008). The 
psychological stress is possibly greater than in richer countries because of male-breadwinner 
stereotypes being stronger, and the financial stress is probably greater because the family relies 
primarily on male income and there is limited state income support. Male unemployment may also 
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raise IPV by reducing the opportunity cost of men’s time (Blattman and Miguel 2010)15, and increasing 
exposure of the woman to the man if he spends more time at home (Chin, 2002).16  
Similarly to this paper, but using Spanish data, Alonso-Borrego and Carrasco (2017) and Tur-
Prats (2017) find that improved female employment opportunities increase violence against women 
for some (although not all) women.17 Alonso-Borrego and Carrasco (2017) find that female 
employment reduces violence only if the female’s partner is employed as well. Tur-Prats (2017) finds 
that in Spanish territories with a historical nuclear family tradition a decrease in female unemployment 
relative to male unemployment increases IPV due to cultural norms pertaining to gender.18 This study 
shows the critical role of women’s access to divorce in explaining this relationship across a number of 
developing countries covering a wide geographical area. It may be that access to divorce is itself 
influenced by historical cultural norms pertaining to gender. However given the wide geographical 
scope of our study it is not possible to use consistent controls for such historical cultural norms, so 
the study cannot tease out the separate influence of gendered norms vs access to divorce in this study.   
Section 2 describes the data and Section 3 the methodology.  Section 4 provides the estimation 
results, Section 5 the robustness checks, and Section 6 provides a discussion and conclusions. 
2 Data 
                                                          
15 The literature on civil conflict emphasizes the opportunity cost of time as a causal factor. It argues that 
economic shocks that leave men without jobs leave them vulnerable to being drawn into soldiering (Blattman 
and Miguel 2010). 
16 The idea that exposure or inadvertent increases in time that the partners spend together increases IPV is 
analogous to the idea in the wider crime literature that incarceration reduces crime. 
17 There is no similar evidence previous to this study for developing countries.  
18 Specifically, she finds that, in areas in which deep-rooted social norms support the male breadwinner 
stereotype, decreases in female relative to male unemployment increase violence. In contrast, in areas in which 
cultural norms viewed both men and women as providers, she finds evidence consistent with the existing US 




The study uses individual data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) which are 
large scale, repeated cross-sectional household surveys that use standardised questionnaires which are 
comparable across countries.  
Intimate partner violence  
Since 1998 the DHS has included a standardised domestic violence module which asks women 
if they have ever experienced specific acts of physical, emotional and sexual abuse. Since 2005, the 
DHS also asks women if they experienced any of these three forms of violence in the twelve months 
preceding the survey date. The study analyses reports of abuse in the last twelve months so as to exploit 
the timing of unemployment shocks. A potential concern with self-reported measures of IPV is that 
women may systematically underreport its incidence (Kishor, 2004). The DHS surveys attempt to 
minimize this through methods of women selection, interviewer training, and interview technique. 
Specifically, only one eligible woman per household is selected for the domestic violence module so 
as to reduce the likelihood that others in the household are aware of the nature of the questions. 
Women are asked the questions only towards the end of the interview so that a rapport has been built 
up between interviewer and respondent before the questions are posed, questions on IPV are only 
asked if absolute privacy is ensured, and translators are avoided to ensure privacy. Finally, interviewers 
are provided with extensive training regarding the appropriate way to ask questions of such a sensitive 
nature.19  
Another possible concern is that reporting behavior changes endogenously with male vs 
female empowerment. It seems plausible that secular (permanent) changes in relative unemployment 
rates will empower or disempower women to report violence. However, it is less plausible that 
                                                          
19 Some recent, limited, evidence from Peru suggests that underreporting may occur for highly educated women 
(Aguero and Frisancho, 2017), but it is unclear how generalizable this is for other country contexts. In any case, 
in all cases, this study controls for education in our analysis. The estimates should remain unbiased and 
consistent with possible measurement error in the dependent variable provided this measurement error is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables 
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reporting changes in response to transitory deviations from trend. This concern is also mitigated by 
the fact that reporting in the DHS is not observable by husbands, due to measures taken by the DHS 
surveyors to ensure privacy and confidentiality, described above.20 Anderberg et al. (2016) use data 
from a crime survey which, in principle, has the same issues as our data. Other studies have used 
more institutionalized data which have different limitations. For instance, Aizer (2010) uses 
hospitalization data, but only severe cases of IPV are hospitalized. Mani et al. (2012) use police 
reports, but many women are reluctant to report IPV to the police for fear that their husbands will 
either exercise backlash or be arrested and taken away (e.g. Iyenger 2009, Amaral et al. 2018).  
The estimation sample includes 31 and 26 countries, respectively, for which physical and 
sexual violence data from the DHS are available for 2005-2016 (see Table S1.1).21 Estimates are 
reported for each of physical and sexual violence and their sum.  The study does not use emotional 
abuse as it is a more subjective measure of abuse. There is substantial variation in the incidence of 
physical and sexual violence across countries; see Figures 1(a) and 1(b).22 
Unemployment rate shocks 
Data on male and female unemployment rates are obtained from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI), sourced from the ILOSTAT database.23 Although violence measures are only available for 
                                                          
20 Only 0.94% of women in the sample were selected for the domestic module but not interviewed due to lack 
of guaranteed privacy. 
21 The sample size for sexual violence is smaller, because in five countries only one of the questions on sexual 
abuse is included, so that the measure of sexual violence in these countries is not comparable to the rest of the 
sample. As a result, these countries are excluded from the sexual violence sample (see Table S1.1). 
22 There is significant coincidence of physical and sexual violence: 19.81 percent of women reported 
experiencing some form of violence over the last twelve months; of these women, 24.23 percent report both 
physical and sexual violence. Of the sample of women who reported suffering some form of violence in the 
last twelve months, 65.81 (9.96) percent reported physical (sexual) violence only. 
23 The ILO estimates are based on either household labour force surveys or population census data, with the 
restriction that they must be representative of the whole country, with no geographic limitation. More 
information on the construction of the estimates is given in Bourmpoula et al. (2015). These rates are positively 
correlated to within-survey employment rates, with a correlation coefficient of 0.299 with female 
unemployment rates in the DHS survey. Men’s employment is less correlated (0.030) but this is not surprising 
because the quality of data on male unemployment in the DHS is low: it is collected in only 18 of our 31 
countries, and where it is collected, it is missing in around 67% of cases. 
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2005-2016, the study uses a longer time series going back to 1991 to model the trend in unemployment 
rates and, thereby, to extract the cyclical component of unemployment using a Hodrik-Prescott Filter 
(Hodrik and Prescott, 1997).24 The study also shows results with an alternative measure, the annual 
change in the logarithm of the unemployment rate.  
Figure S1.1a shows a plot of the cyclical male unemployment vs. cyclical female unemployment 
in the sample with a 45 degree line imposed on top. This shows that the unemployment shocks are 
positively correlated, although there is variation around the 45 degree line. Figure S1.1(b) displays the 
pooled (across countries) mean of cyclical and log-differenced male and female unemployment over 
time for the country-years in our sample. Although shocks to male and female unemployment are 
positively correlated (Figure S1.1(a))25, shocks to female unemployment are larger and there is 
considerable variation in the relative size of each over time, as shown by the ratio and difference 
between the male and female cyclical unemployment (Figures S1.1(c) and S1.1(d)). 
Figure S1.2(a) and (b) plot the unconditional association between country-year cyclical male 
and female unemployment and spousal physical violence rates. At the aggregate level, no clear pattern 
emerges from the data, particularly for female unemployment, though this unconditional association 
does not account for country fixed effects which the regression analysis shows it is important to 
account for (section 4). 
                                                          
24 The stata command –tsfilter hp- is used, with a smoothing value of 6.25 which is the recommended value for 
yearly data. Our results are robust to using instead either 25 or 100 as alternative smoothing parameters. 
25The correlation (covariance) between the aggregate cyclical male and female rates is 0.8463 (0.015, though 
note that the study uses variation within country over time in these series rather than cross-sectional variation). 
Though the sign of the shocks are often the same, this is not always the case and in a number of cases the sign 
of the shocks are opposing. Among examples are Dominican Republic in 2007, Malawi in 2010 and the 
Philippines in 2013. Co-movement of the two series is strongest in the later years in our sample (2014, 2015 
and 2016). It has been confirmed that the results are robust to dropping these years from the analysis (results 





 The equation of interest is: 
𝐼𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑈
𝑓
𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑈
𝑚
𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                (1) 
The dependent variable, 𝐼𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an indicator for whether a woman i in country j in interview 
year t experienced intimate partner violence in the last twelve months. The variables of interest are 
ln Ufjt−1 and ln U
m
jt−1 which are de-trended log female and male unemployment in country j in the 
previous year, respectively.26  In a robustness check, the study investigates replacing the de-trended 
rates with the first-difference of the rate. 
The control variables Xijt in equation (1) include the education of the woman and her partner, 
her age, and an indicator for whether she resides in an urban location. For the sample for which it is 
available, religion is also controlled for.27 Country (γj) and year (γt) fixed effects are included to purge 
country-level unobservables and common shocks respectively. The study does not include country 
specific trends in the main specification since unemployment is already de-trended. However, the 
study checks robustness of the results to the inclusion of country-specific trends. Standard errors are 
robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the country level. The study 
estimates linear probability models using OLS. 
                                                          
26 The study uses lags because surveys conducted in year t query violence in the twelve months up until t, which 
is contemporaneous with unemployment shocks in t-1. 
27 Religion is missing for 34.4% of the sample, since information on religion is not collected in 13 of our surveys; 
including all surveys for Colombia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Peru, Tajikistan and Tanzania, and for 
one survey in the Dominican Republic (2007). Amongst surveys for which information on religion is recorded, 
it is missing for less than 1% of observations.  The study chooses to drop missing observations rather than, for 
example, choosing to code missing values under a new variable (i.e. an indicator for missing religion) due to 
concerns that inclusion of such a variable can bias estimates (Jones, 1996). The study shows robustness to the 
religion control for the subsample for which it is available. 
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Heterogeneity by gender equality in access to divorce 
The study investigates whether the observed association differs between countries in which 
women face more legal, financial, customary or religious barriers in access to divorce than men. It uses 
the OECD 2019 Social Institutions Gender Index (SIGI) which contains a measure of this. The study 
estimates the main specifications for subsamples defined by whether or not men and women have the 
same rights to initiate and finalise divorce (see Table S1.2 for details of these samples, as well as 
comparison with the UK and US as the study referred to studies of these countries earlier).28,29  
3 Results 
Baseline specification 
The study shows estimates of equation (1) for each indicator of IPV, with controls sequentially 
added (Table 1). The study first presents the unconditional correlation, which is negative for male 
unemployment and insignificantly small for female unemployment, mirroring the association observed 
in the raw data in Figure S1.3. The estimates are not sensitive to inclusion of year fixed effects. 
However, they are sensitive to inclusion of country fixed effects, consistent with time-invariant 
country-level characteristics being correlated with both IPV and unemployment rates.  Once country 
fixed effects are in, the estimates are not sensitive to covariates.  
                                                          
28 Equality in access to divorce is defined in the SIGI as "Women have both the same rights to initiate divorce 
and the same requirements to finalise divorce or annulment as men, without negative repercussions on their 
parental authority. This applies to all groups of women. Customary, religious and traditional laws or practices 
do not discriminate against women’s rights regarding divorce or parental authority after divorce" (source: 
https://www.genderindex.org/data/) 
29 Variation in access to divorce may also pick up the variation in social acceptability of divorce. The study 
cross-checked this using data from the World Values Survey (WVS), available for 19 countries in the sample. 
In the sample with equal access, the average score for social acceptability is 4.28, while in the sample where 
women have weaker access to divorce, the social acceptability score is 3.53. Note that social acceptability is 
scored 1 to 10, where 1 indicates that divorce is never justifiable, 10 indicates it is always justifiable and the 
average across the (19) DHS countries for whom WVS data is available is 3.68 while the average over the UK 
and the US is 6.03. 
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In the preferred specification, conditional on country and year effects and covariates, an 
increase in male unemployment rates, holding female unemployment constant, is associated with 
increases in the incidence of physical violence. In contrast, an increase in female unemployment rates, 
holding male unemployment constant, is associated with reductions in the incidence of physical violence 
(column 4 of Panel A, Table 1). The coefficients for sexual violence are of the same sign but are not 
statistically significant once the study includes all controls (Panel B, Table 1). Results for physical and 
sexual violence (Panel C, Table 1) are driven by physical violence. An F-test of equality comfortably 
rejects the null that the coefficients on ln 𝑈𝑓𝑗𝑡−1 and ln 𝑈
𝑚
𝑗𝑡−1 are equal.
30 There is no robust 
statistically significant association between the total (male plus female) unemployment rate and IPV 
(Table S1.3), a finding also shown in Anderberg et al (2016).31  
A potential concern is that the estimates for male and female unemployment are driven by 
multicollinearity. However, the precision of our estimates speaks against multicollinearity.32 In order 
for the study to mistake the sign on the coefficients of interest, the standard errors would have to be 
large enough to encompass the “true” effect with the opposite sign. In this setting this is not the case.  
Still, to investigate this further, the study estimates an alternative specification that includes the total 
(male plus female) unemployment rate and the ratio of the female to the male unemployment rate. The 
study finds that it is the ratio rather than common shocks which influence IPV (see Section 5 below). 
Holding female unemployment rates constant, a rise in male unemployment relative to trend 
by one percent is associated with an increase in the probability that a woman is a victim of physical 
violence by 0.50 percentage points, or an increase of 50 cases per 10,000 (Table 1, Panel A, Column 
                                                          
30 The finding that male and female unemployment shocks have opposing influences on IPV allows us to set 
aside concerns about all confounders that have same-signed correlations with male and female unemployment 
rates. 
31 In the sexual violence specification, the unconditional correlation of total unemployment is significant, but 
this is not robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects. In all other cases the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. 
32 The authors are grateful to the Editor for this insight. 
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(4)). This translates to 2.75% of the mean prevalence rate of physical violence in the sample. An 
upswing in female unemployment from trend of one percent is associated with the risks of physical 
violence decreasing by 0.52 percentage points, or a decrease of 52 cases per 10,000 (Table 1, Panel A, 
Column (4)). This translates to 2.86% of the mean prevalence rate of physical violence in the sample. 
The study find no statistically significant effects for sexual violence.33,34 
The finding that men react adversely to improvements in women’s employment prospects 
conditional upon their own is consistent with models of male-backlash (Macmillan and Gartner 1999, 
Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). When men feel traditional gender roles (male breadwinner) being 
threatened through elevation of women’s relative status, they react negatively, attempting to reassert 
their authority through violence or other means. Evidence consistent with this has been found in other 
domains, in studies not concerned with domestic violence (Schuler et al 1996, Atkinson et al. 2005, 
Mani 2011, Gagliarducci and Paserman 2012, Gangadharan et al 2015).  
 The study now consider how the identified effect sizes compare with previous studies. The 
results for male and female unemployment are very similar in magnitude to those found by Tur-Prats 
(2017), who finds that a one percent increase in female (male) unemployment in Spain is associated 
with a decrease (increase) in risk of experiencing violence by 0.56 (0.37) percentage points, amongst 
provinces in which local historical gender identity norms prescribed men as main contributors to the 
household income. The effects estimates in this study are larger and, for female employment, of 
                                                          
33A rise in female unemployment from trend by one percent is also associated with the risk of physical and/or 
sexual violence decreasing by 0.58 percentage points, or a decrease of 58 cases per 10,000. This translates to 
2.93% of the mean prevalence of physical and/or sexual violence in the sample. Driven by the effects on 
physical violence, a rise in male unemployment relative to trend by one percent is also associated with an 
increase in the probability that a woman is a victim of physical and/or sexual violence by 0.53 percentage points, 
or an increase of 53 cases per 10,000. This translates to 2.66% of the mean prevalence of physical and/or sexual 
violence in the sample.  
34 In an extension of the main analysis, the study investigated whether IPV today is a function of unemployment 
rates in the year of marriage. If unemployment in the year of marriage determines selection on the marriage 
market (i.e. who an individual marries), then it may be the case that unemployment in year of marriage 
determines IPV-patterns (or power balance) within a marriage. However, the study found no statistically 




opposite sign to those reported by Anderberg et al. (2016) for the UK, who find that a 1 percentage 
point increase in female unemployment (holding male unemployment constant) is associated with an 
increase in the risk of experiencing IPV of 0.097 percentage points. Like this study they find that male 
unemployment rates have an effect of similar magnitude but opposite-sign, a 1 ppt increase leading to 
a decrease in IPV of 0.090 ppt.35 As discussed in the Introduction, they motivate their results with a 
model in which, when women have improved outside options (higher employment prospects), and 
the possibility of dissolution of the marriage union, men have an incentive to tame any tendency 
towards violence.36 In section 4.2, the study considers whether the observed associations differ 
between countries in which women can access divorce similarly to men, and countries in which they 
cannot. 
The study also compares its estimates with estimates from studies of domestic violence that 
investigate other causes. For instance, it is estimated that availability of alcohol raises intimate partner 
violence by 5 percentage points in India (Luca et al. (2017)), that public transfers (Mexico’s 
Opportunidades program) lower incidence of IPV by 8.2 percentage points (Bobonis et al., 2013), and 
that a one standard deviation in civil conflict intensity in a respondent’s place of residence raises 
physical IPV by 5.07 percentage points in Rwanda (La Mattina, 2017).  
Heterogeneity by an indicator of gender equality in access to divorce 
                                                          
35 Indeed, this is consistent with evidence that relaxation of divorce laws can lead to a reduction in domestic 
violence due to the resulting change in bargaining power within the household (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006; 
Brassiola, 2016). However, here, the study argues that social norms in many of the countries in the sample limit 
the extent to which divorce can act as a margin for women so that men are less likely to be “tamed” by the 
threat of divorce, explaining the opposite signed result for low income countries. 
36 In the UK and other OECD countries, the fact that divorce is a real option (and not uncommon) implies 
endogenous changes in the composition of surviving marriages. In other words, if the most violent 
partnerships dissolve, IPV will be measured on a lower risk sample. Schaller (2013) and Stevenson and 
Wolfers (2016) present evidence for the United States that divorce (like marriage) is pro-cyclical. However 
there is contrasting evidence from the UK, showing that unexpected improvements in financial circumstances 
lower the risk of divorce (Böheim and Ermish, 2001). If one thinks of divorce as a limiting case for domestic 
violence, then one might imagine that business cycle variation in divorce proxies business cycle variation in 
domestic violence. However, the relationship may flip if the costs of divorce are high 
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The estimates show a striking separation, showing that the associations observed in Table 1 are driven 
entirely by the sample in which women do not have equal access to divorce. For this sample, the 
estimates are remarkably similar to those in Table 1: A rise in male unemployment relative to trend of 
one percent is associated with an increase in the probability that a woman is a victim of physical 
violence of 0.56 percentage points, or an increase of 56 cases per 10,000 (Table 2, Panel A, Column 
(4)). An upswing in female unemployment from trend of one percent is associated with the risks of 
physical violence decreasing by 0.52 percentage points, or a decrease of 52 cases per 10,000 (Table 2, 
Panel A, Column (4)). In contrast, in countries in which women have equal access to divorce (as in 
countries such as the US and UK), the study finds the opposite signed effects. Results for these countries 
align with those in Anderberg et al (2016) for the UK.  
4 Robustness checks 
Here, the study discusses robustness of its results to the inclusion of country-specific trends, 
alternate specifications in which it replaces the cyclical component of the logarithm of the two gender 
specific unemployment rates with the first difference in the logarithms of these rates, and a 
specification that includes the total unemployment rate alongside the ratio of male and female 
unemployment rather than the two rates independently. The study also consider robustness of its 
results to sample composition, and alternative measurements of IPV. 
The study’s findings are robust to including country-specific trends (Table 3). For physical 
violence, the coefficients are attenuated but retain significance. Using the original measure of the 
business cycle (the cyclical component), the study continues to find no statistically significant 
coefficients for changes in male or female unemployment on sexual violence. The study replaced de-
trended log female and male unemployment in equation (1) with the (lagged) first difference in the 
logarithm of the unemployment rate:  
𝐼𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆ ln 𝑢
𝑓
𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2∆ ln 𝑢
𝑚




The results point in the same direction (see Table 4). Increases in male unemployment are 
associated with increased physical violence against women and increases in female unemployment 
with decreases.  
Next, the study replaces the male and female unemployment rates with the total (male plus 
female) unemployment and the ratio of the male to female unemployment rate. The first term captures 
common variation in the two rates, reflecting general economic conditions, while the second captures 
divergence between male and female employment opportunities. The ratio was shown in Figure 
S1.2(c) to exhibit substantial variation over time. For both terms the study uses cyclical components 
of the series as before.  





+ 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                (3) 
The results, in Table 5, suggest no statistically significant association between total cyclical 
unemployment and IPV, for which the study finds a very small estimated coefficient close to zero. 
However, an increase in the ratio of the male to the female unemployment rate of one percent is 
associated with a rise in the risk of physical violence of 0.50 percentage points. 
The study checked whether sample composition drives the results in two ways. Since the 
preferred specification in Table 1 (column (V)) identifies the relationship from the 21 countries for 
which the study has multiple years of data, it re- estimates equation (1) on the subsample of countries 
for which it observes women in at least two years. The results are almost identical (Table S1.4). Second, 
since 23.3% of the sample of women are Indian and 20.4% Colombian, one concern might be that 
these countries are driving the observed effects. In fact, the study finds this is not the case. Figures 
2a-2b, and A4, generalize this, showing the estimated coefficients when the study drops one country 




The main specification measures IPV as dummy variables, taking the value of one if the 
woman has ever faced i) physical, ii) sexual or iii) any form of violence from her partner. As an 
alternative, the study aggregates information from the underlying questions on specific acts of IPV 
into summary indices, since this aggregation can improve statistical power to detect effects that go in 
the same direction within a domain (Kling et al. 2007). The study firsts convert answers to individual 
physical violence and sexual violence questions to z-scores by subtracting the country-specific mean 
and dividing by the country-specific standard deviation, for each of the individual questions on 
physical and sexual violence. The study then averages over these z-scores to create an index for i) 
physical violence, ii) sexual violence, as in Erten and Keskin (2018). Finally, it creates an index for iii) 
any violence, which is the arithmetic mean of the physical and sexual violence indices. Results in Table 
S1.5 show that the results are robust to using indices of violence, and gain statistical significance when 
considering sexual violence (Panel B), which now becomes statistically significant. Overall, the results 
are qualitatively similar and confirm the main analysis.  
Finally, the study investigated the association of domestic violence with the (potentially 
endogenous) individual unemployment status of the woman and her partner, using questions in the 
DHS that ask whether the individual worked in the last 12 months. This acts as a consistency check 
on the main analysis. A caveat is that male unemployment is measured poorly in the DHS data – it is 
collected in only 18 of our 31 countries37, and even where it is collected, it is missing in around 67% 
of cases. Still, the pattern of results for individual unemployment mirrors the pattern for 
unemployment rates (Table S1.6). Holding constant the unemployment status of their spouse, female 
unemployment in the last 12 months is associated with lower incidence of spousal violence. Male 
                                                          
37 This discrepancy in availability across countries is due to the fact that women are not asked about the 
employment status of their partners. Information on spousal unemployment is only available for surveys in 
which a men’s survey is collected, which is not the case in all countries. 
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(spousal) unemployment is associated with a higher incidence of violence, although this is not 
statistically significant in every specification. 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The literature has considered alternative explanations for why men perpetrate violence against 
women partners. Among these are that men gain self-esteem or an enhanced sense of control from 
committing violence (Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997); that they have strategic motivations, such as to 
use violence to extract resources from the woman or her family (Bloch and Rao, 2002); and that 
violence occurs almost inadvertently in response to emotional cues (Card and Dahl, 2011).  Other 
studies have highlighted psychological drivers of abuse such as a history of childhood trauma, 
personality and relationship dysfunctionality (Heise and Kotsadam, 2015), or early life exposure to 
domestic violence (Pollak 2004). Finally, there are studies showing that regional variation in IPV today 
reflects cultural factors rooted in historical customs (Alesina et al. 2016; Tur Prats 2015).   
This paper used comparable and representative repeated cross-sections of survey data from 
up to thirty one countries containing women’s reports of violence committed against them in the 
preceding year. It identified a systematic contemporaneous association of unemployment shocks with 
interpersonal violence. The study finds that changes in male and female unemployment rates have 
opposing association with IPV; these associations are large, at between 2.75 – 2.86% of the mean IPV 
prevalence rates in the sample. However, they are smaller than the estimates obtained by studies on 
the impact of alcohol on IPV (Luca et al., 2017). Interpersonal violence is higher when men are more 
likely to be unemployed and, holding constant male unemployment rates, it is higher if women face 
improved employment probabilities.  
These findings contrast sharply with recent results for the US and the UK (Aizer 2010, 
Anderberg et al. 2015) where IPV has been seen to be decreasing in the gender wage gap and in 
increased employment rates of women respectively. These are countries in which women’s labour 
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force participation has risen considerably in past decades and stabilized, weakening the male 
breadwinner norm, and in which women have much more freedom to exit partnerships. When the 
study separates the sample into those countries where men and women have equal access to divorce 
and those where women’s access is lower, it finds that the results for the former are similar to those 
obtained by Anderberg et al (2015) and Aizer (2010). In a majority of developing countries, however, 
patriarchal norms are much stronger, inequality in access to divorce persists, and women’s 
employment is still on the rise, creating a potential clash between economic changes and norms, which 
may increase the probability of violence.  
In addition to the income effects of male unemployment and female employment, there may 
also be psychological responses driven by social norms. The finding that increases in male 
unemployment rates lead to increased violence against women is consistent with the stresses of 
financial insecurity since unemployment of men challenges income security of the family, and previous 
research shows that cash transfers reduce IPV (see e.g. Hidrobo et al. 2016). It is also consistent with 
psychic costs of unemployment, this being larger for men who grow up with the expectation that they 
will be the providers (Tur-Prats, 2017).  However the finding that women are more likely to be subject 
to violence from a partner when employment prospects for women improve is almost certainly a 
psychic responses, as established in previous research on backlash (since improved employment 
chances for women reduce financial stress, the study can reject that the income channel is at play for 
this result). 38  These findings also reject the ‘exposure reduction’ model which predicts increasing 
violence in response to both male and female unemployment, explained by unemployment increasing 
time spent together, which is assumed to increase the potential for conflict (Dugan et al. 1999, Yoo-
Mi Chin (2012)).  
                                                          
38 Recall that the thought experiment simulated by the regression model is that women’s employment prospects 




While the evidence in this paper is descriptive, the estimated conditional correlations suggest 
that the standard bargaining model, which emphasizes how the power balance within the household 
is sensitive to outside options, may be of more limited empirical significance in poorer countries where 
the outside option is not readily exercised because of explicit (legal) and implicit (social) constraints. 
In her seminal analysis of IPV in the United States, Aizer (2010) challenges the backlash hypothesis 
as being problematic because it “ignores the individual rationality constraints faced by women in 
abusive relationships... as their income increases, women are more likely to end the partnership if 
transfers decline and abuse continues”. The evidence is that in many developing countries, women do 
not have the financial means or the social support to end partnerships. Indeed, a stylized fact 
concerning IPV on a global scale is that it tends to repeat within a couple, suggesting that across the 
world, women do not readily leave a relationship once subject to violence (Davis and Taylor 1997; 
Woodhouse and Dempsey 2016). However the perception (on the part of both men and women) that 
they can may still be effective. 
The results of this study are topical given strong global trends in married women’s labour force 
participation in many parts of the world. In Latin America, many countries, including Mexico and 
Brazil, have witnessed large increases (ILO 2016). Although the large increases in married women’s 
work participation in richer countries occurred earlier, there is contemporary business cycle variation 
in the relative participation rates of men and women. In particular, the recent recession has hit men 
harder than women, narrowing the gender gap. There is a similar tendency in poorer countries, driven 
by subsistence targets strengthening the added worker effect. In other words, women who may 
otherwise not work tend to take work in recessions in order to make up for the decline in male income 
(Bhalotra and Umana-Aponte 2010).  
A recent UN publication outlining a framework to reduce violence against women suggests a 
range of potential approaches, including the empowerment of women and the changing of social 
norms to foster mutual respect between men and women (UN Women, 2015b). These results show 
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that simply increasing employment opportunities for women, as done by several microcredit 
programmes in developing countries, may backfire. Indeed, the literature shows that women often 
draw smaller profits from micro-enterprise than men, and one explanation for this has been the 
existence of inefficient (non-cooperative) models of the household (e.g. De Mel et al. 2009). This has 
not been previously considered but the results of this study suggest that adverse male reactions to 
loans targeting women may play a role.39 Future work should look more carefully at whether 
implementing women’s rights across multiple domains including property rights, custodial rights and 
divorce may better protect against IPV. Community empowerment approaches that attempt to change 
social norms may generate sustained reductions in IPV (More et al. 2017).  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1a: Incidence of physical violence across countries 
 
 
Figure 1b: Incidence of sexual violence across countries 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS). 
Notes:  
Figures show the percentage of women who reported experiencing a) physical 





Figure 2a: Variation in estimated coefficients across sample – physical violence 
 
 
Figure 2b: Variation in estimated coefficients across sample – sexual violence 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS). 
Notes:  
Figures show estimated coefficients from a leave one out analysis, with 95% confidence 
intervals. Estimations include individual level controls, and country and year fixed effects. 
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Table 1: Impact of cyclical fluctuations in male and female unemployment rates on IPV 
  Main Sample 
Restricted sample: 
religion controls 
                    (1)          (2)    (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A: Physical Violence      
 
Ln(Uf) 0.171 0.347* -0.534*** -0.519*** -0.502*** -0.506*** 
             (0.148) (0.178) (0.081) (0.083) (0.107) (0.108) 
Ln(Um) -0.312** -0.479** 0.508*** 0.497*** 0.458*** 0.462*** 
             (0.151) (0.182) (0.086) (0.088) (0.163) (0.164) 
Observations            381730 381730 381730 348165 206641 206641 
P-value F-test 0.107 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
Mean Violence 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.181 0.187 0.187 
Mean Ln(Uf) 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.024 0.062 0.062 
Mean Ln(Um) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.019 0.019 
B: Sexual Violence            
Ln(Uf) 0.038 0.089 -0.172 -0.172 -0.159 -0.160 
             (0.126) (0.142) (0.107) (0.109) (0.116) (0.115) 
Ln(Um)   -0.150 -0.186 0.141 0.140 0.105 0.107 
             (0.112) (0.135) (0.107) (0.107) (0.159) (0.159) 
Observations            275718 275718 275718 268173 199929 199929 
P-value F-test 0.436 0.325 0.150 0.154 0.336 0.332 
Mean Violence 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.067 0.075 0.075 
Mean Ln(Uf) 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.061 0.061 
Mean Ln(Um) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.016 0.016 
C: Any Violence            
Ln(Uf) 0.204 0.326 -0.584*** -0.581*** -0.509*** -0.512*** 
             (0.176) (0.215) (0.148) (0.153) (0.150) (0.150) 
Ln(Um) -0.401** -0.521** 0.535*** 0.527*** 0.426* 0.430* 
             (0.178) (0.219) (0.157) (0.159) (0.216) (0.217) 
Observations            274002 274002 274002 266517 198400 198400 
P-value F-test 0.094 0.058 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.017 
Mean Violence 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.208 0.208 
Mean Ln(Uf) 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.061 0.061 
Mean Ln(Um) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.017 0.017 
Year FE  Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE   Y Y Y Y 
X controls    Y Y Y 
Religion controls      Y 
Source:  
Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and are clustered at 
the country level. All estimates are of equation (1). The dependent variable in each regression is a binary dummy variable 
taking the value one if the individual female respondent was a victim of violence, defined as physical (panel A), sexual 
(panel B) or either (panel C) in the last twelve months. P-value F-test refers to the F-test that the coefficients on ln(Uf) and 
ln(Um) are equal. X is a vector of controls for age and education of respondent, education of her spouse, and urban 
location. The restricted sample is the sub-sample of surveys for which information on respondent religion is non-missing. 
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Table 2: Heterogeneity by access to divorce 
             (I) (II) (III) 
  
Physical 
Violence    
Sexual 
Violence    
Any 
Violence    
A: Equal access to divorce  
ln(Uf) 1.433*** 1.526*** 1.211*** 
      (0.087) (0.019) (0.051) 
ln(Um)  -0.789***  -0.815***  -0.662*** 
      (0.045) (0.009) (0.023) 
Observations 95040 35794 35736 
X controls Y Y Y 
Country and Year FE Y Y Y 
B: Women lack equal access to divorce  
Ln(Uf) -0.517*** -0.290**  -0.631**  
      (0.107) (0.131) (0.243) 
Ln(Um)   0.562*** 0.200 0.597*** 
      (0.077) (0.121) (0.191) 
Observations 253125 232379 230781 
X controls Y Y Y 
Country and Year FE Y Y Y 
Source:  
Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS). 
Notes: 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary 
forms of heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the country level. All 
estimates are of equation (1). The dependent variable in each regression is 
a binary dummy variable taking the value one if the individual female 
respondent was a victim of violence, defined as physical (I), sexual (II) or 
either (III) in the last twelve months. X is a vector of controls for age and 
education of respondent, education of her spouse, and urban location. 
Details on the countries in samples in panel A and B, as well as the 
definition of equality in access to divorce, is given in Table S1.2. 
Differences in observations between columns (I) compared to (II) and 
(III) are due to information on sexual violence not being collected in all 
surveys (see Table S1.1).  
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Table 3: Robustness of results to inclusion of country-specific trends 
             (1) (2) (3) 






ln(Uf) -0.301***  0.050 -0.249*** 
             (0.071) (0.060) (0.063) 
ln(Um)  0.308**  -0.070  0.254*** 
             (0.135) (0.054) (0.085) 
Observations 348165 268173 266517 
    
P-value F-test 0.006 0.287 0.001 
Mean Violence 0.181 0.067 0.198 
X controls Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Country FE Y Y Y 
Country Specific Trends Y Y Y 
 
Source:  
Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). 
 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in each regression 
is a binary dummy variable taking the value one if the individual female respondent was a victim 
of violence, defined as physical (I), sexual (II) or either (III) in the last twelve months. X is a vector 
of controls for age and education of respondent, education of her spouse, and urban location. In 
addition, country-specific trends are controlled for.  
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Table 4: Use of first difference in the logarithm of the unemployment rate 
 
             (1) (2) (3) 







                
Δln(Uf) -0.150** -0.020 -0.195 
             (0.069) (0.080) (0.132) 
Δln(Um)   0.177** 0.024 0.197 
             (0.071) (0.073) (0.118) 
Observations 348165 268173 266517 
    
Mean Violence 0.181 0.067 0.198 
X controls Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Country FE Y Y Y 
 
Source:  




* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are robust to 
arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the country 
level. All estimates are of equation (2). The dependent variable in each 
regression is a binary dummy variable taking the value one if the 
individual female respondent was a victim of violence, defined as 
physical (1), sexual (2) or either (3) in the last twelve months. X is a 
vector of controls for age and education of respondent, education of 
her spouse, and urban location. Relative to Table 1, the HP-filter 
detrended unemployment rates are replaced with the first difference in 





Table 5: Alternative Specification including total unemployment and the ratio of 
male to female unemployment 
 








ln(U)        -0.019 -0.030 -0.049 
             (0.055) (0.037) (0.066) 
ln(Uratio)   0.509*** 0.157 0.554*** 
             (0.082) (0.108) (0.155) 
Observations 348165 268173 266517 
    
X controls   Y Y Y 
Year FE      Y Y Y 
Country  FE  Y Y Y 
 
Source:  




* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are robust to 
arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the 
country level. All estimates are of equation (3). The dependent 
variable in each regression is a binary dummy variable taking the 
value one if the individual female respondent was a victim of 
violence, defined as physical (1), sexual (2) or either (3) in the last 
twelve months. X is a vector of controls for age and education of 
respondent, education of her spouse, and urban location. Relative 
to Table 1, the HP-filter detrended male and female 
unemployment rates are replaced with the HP-filter detrended 
unemployment, ln(U), and the detrended ratio of the male to 
female unemployment, ln(Uratio). 
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Supplementary Online Appendix S1: Additional Figures and Tables  
 




(a) Plot of cyclical log male unemployment 
(lnUm) against cyclical log female 














(b) Cyclical log male (lnUm) and female 






(d) Difference in cyclical log male and 
female unemployment (lnUm– lnUf) over 
time 
Source:  
Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). 
 
Notes: 
1. Figure (a) shows a plot of the cyclical log female unemployment against cyclical log male 
unemployment, for the sample used in Table 1. A 45° line is overlaid on the graph. 
2. Figure (b) shows plots of both cyclical log female unemployment and cyclical log male unemployment 
over time, for the sample used in Table 1. 
3. Figure (c) shows a plot of the ratio of cyclical log male to female unemployment over time, for the 
sample used in Table 1. 
4. Figure (d) shows a plot of the difference in cyclical log male and female unemployment over time, for 
the sample used in Table 1. 








(a) Country-year cyclical female unemployment against physical violence rate. 
 
 
(b) Country-year cyclical male unemployment against physical violence rate. 
 
Source:  
Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). 
 
Notes: 
1. Physical violence rate is the country-year percentage of women who experienced physical violence at 
the hands of their partner in the last 12 months. 
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Figure S1.3: Variation in estimated coefficients across sample – 




Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). 
 
Notes:  
As in figures 2a and 2b this figure shows estimated coefficients from a leave one out analysis, 
with 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the woman 
experienced physical and/or sexual violence. Estimations include individual level controls, and 




Table S1.1: Countries and years in sample  
Physical Violence Sample Sexual Abuse Sample 
Azerbaijan; 2006  Azerbaijan; 2006  
Bangladesh, 2007 Burkina Faso; 2010 
Burkina Faso; 2010 Cambodia; 2005, 2006, 2014 
Cambodia; 2005, 2006, 2014 Democratic Republic of Congo; 2007, 2013, 2014 
Cameroon, 2011 Dominican Republic; 2007 , 2013 
Colombia 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010 Gabon; 2012  
Democratic Republic of Congo; 2007, 2013, 2014 Ghana; 2008  
Dominican Republic; 2007 , 2013 Haiti; 2005, 2006, 2012 
Gabon; 2012  Honduras; 2011, 2012 
Ghana; 2008  India; 2005, 2006 
Haiti; 2005, 2006, 2012 Kenya; 2008, 2009, 2014 
Honduras; 2011, 2012 Kyrgyz Republic; 2012  
India; 2005, 2006 Liberia; 2006, 2007  
Jordan, 2007, 2012 Malawi; 2010, 2015, 2016 
Kenya; 2008, 2009, 2014 Mali; 2012, 2013 
Kyrgyz Republic; 2012  Mozambique; 2011 
Liberia; 2006, 2007  Peru;  2010, 2011, 2012  
Malawi; 2010, 2015, 2016 Philippines; 2008 , 2013 
Mali; 2012, 2013 Rwanda; 2014, 2015 
Mozambique; 2011 Sao Tome and Principe; 2008, 2009 
Pakistan, 2012, 2013 Tajikistan; 2012 
Peru;  2010, 2011, 2012  Tanzania; 2009, 2010, 2015, 2016 
Philippines; 2008 , 2013 Timor Leste; 2009, 2010 
Rwanda; 2014, 2015 Uganda; 2006, 2011 
Sao Tome and Principe; 2008, 2009 Ukraine; 2007  
Tajikistan; 2012 Zambia; 2007 , 2013, 2014 
Tanzania; 2009, 2010, 2015, 2016  
Timor Leste; 2009, 2010  
Uganda; 2006, 2011  
Ukraine; 2007   
Zambia; 2007 , 2013, 2014  
  




Table S1.2: Equality in divorce access 
Equal access to divorce Inequality in access to divorce 
Colombia  Azerbaijan  
Haiti  Bangladesh  
Honduras  Burkina Faso  
Kyrgyz Republic  Cambodia  
Mozambique  Cameroon  
Sao Tome and Principe  Democratic Republic of Congo  




 Jordan  
 Kenya  
 Liberia  
 Malawi  
 Mali  
 Pakistan  
 Peru  
 Philippines  
 Rwanda  
 Tajikistan  
 Tanzania  
 Timor Leste  
 Uganda  
  Zambia 
Source:  
OECD 2019 Social and Institutions Gender Index, https://www.genderindex.org/ 
Notes:  
1. Equality in access to divorce is defined in the SIGI as "Women have both the same rights to 
initiate divorce and the same requirements to finalise divorce or annulment as men, without 
negative repercussions on their parental authority. This applies to all groups of women. 
Customary, religious and traditional laws or practices do not discriminate against women’s 
rights regarding divorce or parental authority after divorce". 
2. * Not in sample; included for comparative purposes. 
 




Table S1.3: Impact of cyclical fluctuations in total (male plus female) unemployment rates 
on IPV  
             (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A: Physical Violence    
ln(U)        -0.104 -0.107  0.061  0.063 
             (0.089) (0.093) (0.104) (0.109) 
Observations 381730 381730 381730 348165 
B: Sexual Violence    
ln(U)        -0.093*   -0.089*    0.003  0.002 
             (0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) 
Observations 275718 275718 275718 268173 
C: Any Violence    
ln(U)        -0.146 -0.177*    0.066  0.061 
             (0.100) (0.087) (0.121) (0.123) 
Observations 274002 274002 274002 266517 
Year FE  Y Y Y 
Country FE   Y Y 
X controls    Y 
Source:  
Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS). 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variables, controls 
and standard error adjustments are as in Table 1. Relative to Table 
1, the study now uses the total (male + female) unemployment rate 




Table S1.4: Impact of cyclical fluctuations in male and female unemployment rates on IPV; 
restricted sample of countries for which two or more years of data are available 
                    (1)          (2)         (3)    (4) 
A: Physical Violence   
ln(Uf)  0.177  0.237 -0.534*** -0.519*** 
             (0.162) (0.210) (0.082) (0.083) 
ln(Um)   -0.355**  -0.432**   0.508***  0.496*** 
             (0.158) (0.200) (0.086) (0.089) 
Observations            344239 344239 344239 311775 
P-value F-test 0.102 0.110 0.000 0.000 
Mean Violence 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.183 
Mean ln(Uf) 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.023 
Mean ln(Um) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.012 
B: Sexual Violence     
ln(Uf)  0.036  0.105 -0.172 -0.172 
             (0.159) (0.191) (0.108) (0.110) 
ln(Um)   -0.172 -0.222  0.141  0.140 
             (0.138) (0.182) (0.108) (0.108) 
Observations            238067 238067 238067 231632 
P-value F-test 0.490 0.388 0.160 0.165 
Mean Violence 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.072 
Mean ln(Uf) 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.021 
Mean ln(Um) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
C: Any Violence     
ln(Uf)  0.208  0.211 -0.584*** -0.581*** 
             (0.203) (0.237) (0.150) (0.154) 
ln(Um)   -0.458**  -0.475*    0.535***  0.526*** 
             (0.195) (0.248) (0.158) (0.161) 
Observations            236542 236542 236542 230155 
P-value F-test 0.107 0.171 0.002 0.002 
Mean Violence 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.203 
Mean ln(Uf) 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.021 
Mean ln(Um) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Year FE  Y Y Y 
Country FE   Y Y 
X controls    Y 
  
Source:  
Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). 
 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variables, controls and standard 
error adjustments are as in Table 1. Relative to Table 1, the sample is now 
restricted to only those countries for which two or more years of data on women 
are available.  
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Table S1.5: Alternative dependent variables – using indices of IPV 
  (1)   (2)  (3) (4) 
A: Physical Violence   
ln(Uf) -0.007 -0.373*** -0.409*** -0.386*** 
 (0.029) (0.120) (0.109) (0.119) 
ln(Um)   -0.008 0.347*** 0.331*** 0.325** 
 (0.042) (0.108) (0.115) (0.125) 
Observations 381730 381730 381730 348165 
Mean Violence Index 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
B: Sexual Violence     
ln(Uf) -0.164** -0.953*** -0.881*** -0.887*** 
 (0.074) (0.185) (0.270) (0.278) 
ln(Um)   0.173** 0.847*** 0.828*** 0.834*** 
 (0.084) (0.158) (0.242) (0.244) 
Observations 275718 275718 275718 268173 
Mean Violence Index -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
C: Any Violence     
ln(Uf) -0.088 -0.725*** -0.668*** -0.679*** 
 (0.052) (0.121) (0.205) (0.213) 
ln(Um)   0.084 0.642*** 0.601*** 0.610*** 
 (0.066) (0.111) (0.206) (0.212) 
Observations 274002 274002 274002 266517 
Mean Violence Index 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Year FE  Y Y Y 
Country FE   Y Y 




Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the country level. X is a vector of controls for age 
and education of respondent, education of her spouse, and urban location.  Relative to 




Table S1.6: Replacing country unemployment rate shocks with individual unemployment 
status  
                    (1)          (2)         (3)          (4)    
A: Physical Violence          
Own unemployment -0.026* -0.032** -0.036*** -0.042*** 
             (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) 
Spousal unemployment -0.002 -0.011 -0.005 0.004 
             (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Observations 88080 88080 88080 74704 
B: Sexual Violence          
Own unemployment -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026** 
             (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Spousal unemployment 0.024** 0.018* 0.011 0.012* 
             (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) 
Observations 75611 75611 75611 74920 
C: Any Violence          
Own unemployment -0.042** -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.050*** 
             (0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) 
Spousal unemployment 0.016 0.005 0.008 0.012 
             (0.027) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) 
Observations 75356 75356 75356 74669 
Year FE  Y Y Y 
Country FE   Y Y 
X controls    Y 
 
Source:  
Authors’ analysis based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in each 
regression is a binary dummy variable taking the value one if the individual female respondent 
was a victim of violence, defined as physical (panel A), sexual (panel B) or either (panel C) in the 
last twelve months. X is a vector of controls for age and education of respondent, education of 
her spouse, and urban location. Relative to Table 1, female and male unemployment rate shocks 
are replaced with an indicator for the individual unemployment status of the woman and her 
partner. Information on employment status of partner is available in only 18 of our 32 countries. 
 
